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Taking the Wind out of the
Government's Sails?:
Forfeitures and Just Compensation
J. Kelly Strader*
In two distinct areas of the law, the United States Supreme Court has
signalled fundamental shifts in constitutional doctrine over the last
several years. These shifts portend new limitations on the Government's
power to seize and obtain forfeiture of private property. First, in cases
decided under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause' and
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,2 the United States Supreme
Court has placed severe constraints on the scope of and the procedures
for governmental forfeitures.' Second, in cases decided under the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause,4 the Court has modified and, in some

* Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. B.A., College of
William & Mary; M.I.A., Columbia University; J.D., University of Virginia. This article

was made possible by a Summer Research Grant from the Southwestern University
School of Law Faculty Development Program. My thanks to my colleague James A.
Kushner for his invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this article, to Diana
Parker, Esq., of Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand, Iason & Silberberg, for her insights, and
to Paris Sahba, Alex Boudov, Kyle Brodie, and Andrew Williams for their able research assistance.
With respect to the discussion of United States v. Regan, 699 F. Supp. 36, 37
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), infra, Part II, I was affiliated with a law firm that represented a defendant in that case. The views concerning that case expressed in this article are
mine alone.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive
fines imposed . .

").

2. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . .

").

3. See Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2802 (1993) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to in rem forfeitures); United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 114 S.Ct. 492 (1993) (holding that the government must comply
with the Due Process Clause in civil forfeiture of real property unless exigent circumstances exist).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").

cases, expanded individuals' rights to receive just compensation for
governmental regulation of private property.'
In both areas, a majority of the Court has emphasized property rights,
even where that emphasis has conflicted with the Government's ability
to regulate property use in the public interest and to exercise its police
powers in furtherance of law enforcement. The Court has yet to address the Takings Clause in the context of seizures and forfeitures. It is
upon the potentially substantial impact of takings jurisprudence on the
law of forfeitures that this Article focuses.
Recent developments in the law of just compensation have been
startling. In 1994, the United States Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of
Tigard6 reinforced a potentially dramatic expansion of the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause that had begun in 1987 with FirstEnglish
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,7
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.' The expansion continued in 1992 with Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCouncil.' In Dolan, a
five member majority led by Chief Justice Rehnquist held for the first
time that, to avoid requiring payment of just compensation, governmental control over private property must be supported by "rough proportionality" between the asserted governmental interest and the restriction
on the property's use."0 Although decided in the context of required
dedications of land use," Dolan is the fourth in a line of recent Su-

5. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2312 (1994) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment requires the city to make an individual determination that there is a
"rough proportionality" between a permit requirement and its impact on proposed
development); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892-95
(1992) (holding that state deprivation of landowner of all economically viable land
usages requires compensation); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 839
(1987) (holding that the California Coastal Commission could not impose a condition
on a building permit without compensation). See generally Bruce W. Burton, Regulatory Takings and the Shape of Things to Come: Harbingers of a Takings Clause
Reconstellation, 72 OR. L. REv. 603, 605 (1993) (describing the "increased judicial
activism regarding the meaning and scope of the Takings Clause"). The Supreme
Court has held that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause limits state action under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241
(1897).
6. Dolan, 114 S.Ct. at 2317-20.
7. 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (holding that the Fifth Amendment entitled a landowner to compensation for a period of Government action that constituted a taking).
8. 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987) (limiting. municipal zoning exaction as a taking).
9. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889 (1992) (holding that state must compensate landowner if
a regulation completely destroys its economically beneficial use unless the landowner
did not hold title so as to use the land in the proscribed manner).
10. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
11. The City Planning Commission conditioned approval of Dolan's application to
expand her store and pave her parking lot upon compliance with a requirement that
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preme Court opinions requiring just compensation under circumstances
where the Court might not have previously done so.
Current Supreme Court takings jurisprudence may have profound
implications in areas beyond the land use regulation cases upon which
that jurisprudence is now centered.'2 Whenever the Government assumes or seeks to assume control over property or its use, and the required nexus between the regulation and the governmental interest is
open to question, the owner may have a claim for just compensation. 3
Seemingly far from the land use context lies the practice of governmental seizures and forfeitures of property. Acting pursuant to federal
statutes,'4 law enforcement authorities in recent years have significantly increased both assumption of temporary control over and permanent
possession of property. 5

she dedicate a portion of her property for a public greenway and a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway. Id. at 2313-14.
12. See infra notes 64-104 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 157-81 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962 (1988) (prohibiting activities); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(money laundering); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (narcotics). A number of
states also enacted statutes that sometimes parallel the federal statutes. See, e.g.
CAL. FIN. CODE § 5320 (West Supp. 1995) (subjecting property to forfeiture for violations of laws governing lending institutions); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §. 11470
(West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (allowing for forfeiture of property used or intended for
use in violation of drug laws); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2723 (1994) (providing for forfeiture of property used in prostitution), 33-553 (1994) (placing the burden of proof of
ownership or claim of exemption or exception from forfeiture on the party claiming
it); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 480.05 (McKinney 1994) (allowing forfeiture for proceeds or
instrumentalities of drug offenses). Although this Article focuses on federal forfeiture
statutes, state forfeiture statutes also implicate the Federal Constitution's Takings
Clause, along with any parallel state constitutional provisions. See Richard M. Frank,
Inverse Condemnation Litigation in the 1990s-77e Uncertain Legacy of the Supreme Court's Lucas and Yee Decisions, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 85, 87

(1993) (stating that the "the 'Takings Clause' or 'Just Compensation Clause' of the
Fifth Amendment applies to limit state and local, as well as federal, government action") (citing Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)). See
generally Jan G. Laitos, The Takings Clause in America's Industrial States After
Lucas, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 281 (1993) (discussing the effect of a modified takings test
on subsequent state actions).
15. Forfeiture receipts for the Department of Justice evidence a rapid rate of increase:
Fiscal Year
Forfeiture Receipts (in Millions)
1985
$ 27.2
1986
$ 93.7

To the surprise of many Court-watchers,'" the Supreme Court has
recently begun to place severe restrictions on these seizures and forfeitures. Although long considered to be beyond the purview of constitutional rights relating to criminal proceedings, 7 the Court in Austin v.
United States8 held for the first time that civil forfeiture proceedings
are subject to the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. 9 Furthermore, in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property," the
Court held that the Due Process Clause requires notice and a hearing
before the Government can seize real property pursuant to the federal
forfeiture statutes.2'
The Court's increased willingness to scrutinize seizures and forfeitures parallels its increased willingness to require just compensation in

1987
$177.6
1988
$207.3
1989
$580.8
1990
$459.6
1991
$644.0
William P. Nelson, Comment, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Constable Blundered? Gaining Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of Asset
Forfeiture, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1324 (1992).
16. See generally Mary E. di Zerega, Austin v. United States: An Analysis of the
Application of the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeitures, 2 GEO. MASON U. L REV.
127, (1994) (agreeing with result in Austin, but questioning reasoning in application
of Eighth Amendment to all forfeiture proceedings); Douglas S. Reinhart, Note, Applying The Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture After Austin v. United States: Excessiveness and Proportionality,36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235 (1994) (suggesting that the
Austin decision will have slight effect on civil forfeiture proceedings); Robin M.
Sackett, Comment, The Impact of Austin v. United States: Extending Constitutional
Protections to Claimants in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L REV.
495 (1994) (discussing the need for more constitutional protections in civil forfeiture
proceedings).
17. See, e.g., United States v. $84,740.00 Currency, 981 F.2d 1110, 1110-14 (9th Cir.
1992) ("[Tlwo criminal law protections ... apply in civil forfeitures: the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule and the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination."); Sequoia Books, Inc. v. Ingemunson, 901 F.2d 630, 639 (7th Cir.) (explaining
that civil forfeiture actions are outside the scope of the constitutional protections extended to criminal defendants), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 959 (1990); United States v. 40
Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1989) (explaining that civil forfeiture proceeding does not "constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause"); United States v. D.KG. Appaloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d 532, 545 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution does not bar civil drug
forfeiture statutes), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 976 (1988). In the wake of Austin, courts
have applied the Double Jeopard Clause to civil forfeitures. See infra note 182.
18. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
19. Id. at 2812.
20. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
21. Id. at 505. The federal forfeiture statutes grant the government power to seize
or restrain property in order to preserve it pending the conclusion of a formal forfeiture proceeding. See infra part II.
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the land use context. In both areas, the Court's focus on individual
property rights runs counter to the Government's stated policy goals.
These two developments portend an inevitable collision between the
Government's expansive use of forfeiture statutes and the law of takings.
Signs of this collision have been apparent for some time. In recent
years, federal district and circuit courts have issued a number of rulings
requiring just compensation in the forfeiture context, albeit in relatively
narrow circumstances.' In light of Dolan, however, the Government
may now bear a significant additional burden to justify temporary or
permanent takings-proportionality not only under the Excessive Fines
Clause, but also under the potentially more far-reaching Takings
Clause.'
This Article addresses whether the Takings Clause may come to provide a serious impediment to the Government's expansive use of forfeitures. The Article first examines the development of takings law and
the Supreme Court's recent takings cases."' Next, the Article analyzes
the background of, procedures for, and constitutional restrictions on
seizures and forfeitures, focusing on the recent Austin and James Daniel Good decisions.25 Finally, the Article explores the potential intersection of these two doctrinal quagmires. 6
I.

OVERVIEW OF TAKINGS LAW

Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, private
property may not be. "taken" by the Government without "just compensation."" The United States Supreme Court has hardly been clear or
consistent in defining the term "taking;" consequently, takings law has
long been considered to be among the most confused areas of federal
constitutional doctrine.' Further, seizures and forfeitures often do not

22. See, e.g., Shelden v. United States, 7 F.3d 1022, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1993); infra
part uI.A.2.
23. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319-20 (1994).
24. See infra notes 27-104 and accompanying text.
25. See irfra notes 105-82 and accompanying text
26. See infra notes 183-285 and accompanying text.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. Partly as a result of this confusion, takings jurisprudence has produced an
enormous amount of critical analysis. See generally, e.g., JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDMSION LAW AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 3.05 (1995) (discussing takings law) [hereinafter KUSHNER, GROWTH MANAGEMENT]; Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental

fall neatly within either of the commonly-cited takings categories:
"physical" takings, involving physical occupation of the owner's property, and "regulatory" takings, involving regulation of the property's use.29
In two recent decisions, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission" and Dolan v. City of Tigard,3 the Court has attempted to articulate a comprehensive approach to takings law. In both of these cases,
the Court continued its expansion of the circumstances in which just
compensation is required. Because pre-Lucas and pre-Dolan law remains important, it is necessary to first review that law.
A.

The Early Takings Cases
Courts and commentators generally view the Takings Clause as pro-

Civil Right, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187 (1992) (discussing property as a fundamental
right and the effects of modern regulation) [hereinafter Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right]; Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987
SuP. CT. REV. 1 (1987) (advocating the use of the Takings Clause to protect property
rights from modern regulation) [hereinafter Epstein, Takings]; Norman Karlin, Back to
the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 627 (1988) (arguing that
courts must protect property rights from unconstitutional regulations); Douglas W.
Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630 (1988) (stating that, although the Takings Clause "does
not supply a remedy for every legislative redefinition of property," it "can hardly be
seen as a constitutional failure when the document expressly delegates or reserves
that authority"); James A. Kushner, Property and Mysticism: The Legality of Exactions as a Condition for Public Development Approval in the Time of the Rehnquist
Court, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVrL, L. 53, 60-78 (1992) (considering the impact of Nottan
on state exaction cases) [hereinafter Kushner, Property and Mysticism]; Frank
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (stating that the "one incontestable case for compensation" occurs when the Government physically invades land
and that judicial decisions in takings cases are "liberally salted with paradox")
[hereinafter Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness]; Frank Michelman, Takings,
1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988) ("The war between popular self-government and
strongly constitutionalized property now comes to seem not containable but total.")
[hereinafter Michelman, Takings]; Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36 (1964) (maintaining that the Takings Clause is designed to discourage
"arbitrary government action," but that takings jurisprudence is "a welter of confusing
and apparently incompatible results").
29. See, e.g., Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson, 37 F.3d 468, 473 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("There are two classes of Fifth Amendment takings recognized by the
Supreme Court: physical takings and regulatory takings."). Compare Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (physical taking) with First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1986) (regulatory taking). As discussed more fully in infra, Part II, seizures and
forfeitures may involve complex combinations of physical occupation or possession of
property and limitations on property's use.
30. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
31. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
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viding an important limitation on the Government's exercise of its eminent domain and police powers 2 Originally, takings claims primarily
arose in eminent domain cases where the Government took full possession of the property in question.' In one important early case, Mugler
v. Kansas,' the owner of a brewery sought compensation when the
state forbade the manufacture or sale of alcohol.' The Court rejected
the brewery owner's claim because the state regulation was solely designed to protect the public.' The Mugler decision and its progeny
came to be known for the proposition that the government may regulate a "harmful" or "noxious" use of public property without paying just
compensation."
In 1922, however, the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,' recognized that the exercise of the state's police powers may
give rise to a compensable taking.39 Writing for the majority, Justice
Holmes stated, "The general rule at least is, that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. "'
In the decades following Pennsylvania Coal, the Court continued to
apply this vague test, which provided little predictability."' Not until its

32. See, e.g., Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Takings
Clause, while conferring substantial protection on property owners, does not eliminate
the police power of the state to enact limitations on the use of their property.");
Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, supra note 28, at 187.
33. See Jeb Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1083 (1993).
34. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
35. Id. at 653.
36. Id. at 655.
37. As discussed more fully infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text, Lucas apparently limits the applicability of the "noxious use" doctrine. See Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct 2886, 2897 (1992).
38. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
39. Id. at 413.
40. Id. at 415. The Pennsylvania Coal Company sold surface rights to land, while
keeping the right to mine beneath the surface. Id. at 412. The buyers sued to prevent
this mining based upon a law subsequently adopted by the State. Id. at 412-13. The
trial court "found that if not restrained the defendant would cause [damages] . . .but
denied an injunction, holding that the statute, if applied, would be unconstitutional."
Id. at 412. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "held that the statute was a
legitimate exercise of the police power and directed a decree for plaintiffs." Id. The
United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 416.
41. See Ann T. Kadlecek, Note, The Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council on the Law of Regulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L REv. 415, 418 (1993)
("Throughout the middle of the twentieth century, takings jurisprudence did not prog-

1978 decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York," did the Court attempt to refine its general approach to takings
cases.3
B.

The Penn Central Approach

After decades of uncertainty, the Supreme Court in Penn Central
endeavored to provide some clarity to takings law." The Court conceded that its previous takings cases were based upon "essentially ad hoc,

factual inquiries."0 The Court went on, however, to establish three factors in the takings inquiry:
[1] The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, (21
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment backed
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is [31 the character of
the governmental action. A 'taking' may be more readily found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by the government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.'

The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan, used this test to
reject a claim for just compensation filed by the owners of the Grand
Central Terminal." The owners had sued for just compensation when
the New York City Landmarks Commission refused to approve their
plans for the construction of an office tower over the terminal.' Applying the above factors, the Court first noted that not all land use restrictions give rise to takings claims; zoning ordinances, for example,
generally do not. 9 Second, the Court noted that the landmark regulations were broadly applicable, did not single out Penn Central, and did
not restrict the then-current use of the terminal.' Finally, the Court concluded that "the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York citizens

ress beyond, or clarify the vague 'too far' test of Pennsylvania Coal . . . [Hiowever,
the increasing number of restrictive regulations . . . triggered additional taking challenges, and highlighted the deficiencies in the 'too far' test." (footnotes omitted)).
42. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
43. See Andrew R. Mylott, Note, Is There a Doctrine in the House?: The Nuisance
Exception to the Taking Clause Has Been Mortally Wounded by Lucas, 1992 Wis. L.
REV. 1299, 1308 (1992) ("With the Penn Central decision in 1978, the Court began to
clarify its regulatory taking doctrine by formulating general tests to be applied to
taking disputes.").
44. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123.
45. Id. at 124.
46. Id.; accord Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
47. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
48. Id. at 116-19.
49. Id. at 131.
50. Id.
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and all structures, both economically and by improving the quality of life
in the city as a whole."'
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens,
dissented, arguing that landmark restrictions are much more selective
and onerous than zoning restrictions. 2 Focusing on the Constitution's
guarantees of property rights, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The Court has frequently held that, even where a destruction of property rights
would not otherwise constitute a taking, the inability of the owner to make a
reasonable return on his property requires compensation under the Fifth
Amendment .... A taking does not become a noncompensable exercise of police
power simply because the government in its grace allows the owner to make
some 'reasonable' use of his property.0

Given the changes in the Court's personnel since 1978, and the Court's
recent takings cases, there is a good chance that the Penn Central outcome would be different were the case decided today. Nevertheless, the
Penn Central approach continues to be influential, probably because it
gives some structure to a previously chaotic area of the law.
Nine years after the Penn Central decision, the Supreme Court, in
Agins v. City of Tiburon,' articulated a two-part takings test. The Court
held that a governmental regulation can give rise to a takings claim if
that regulation constitutes either an impermissible use of the
Government's police power, or a denial of the owner's "economically
viable use of the property. " '
C.

Temporary Takings

Traditionally, takings cases arose where the government took permanent physical control over property, or placed a permanent regulatory

51. Id. at 134.
52. Id. at 138-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 149 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
55. Id. at 260. In response to the purchase of a five-acre plot of unimproved land
by a developer, the city enacted zoning ordinances that limited construction on five
acre lots to between one and five single family dwellings. Id. at 258. Without attempting to comply with the ordinances, appellants brought suit in state court alleging that the ordinances effected a taking of their property without just compensation
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 259. The Court held that
the ordinances did not facially operate as a taldng. Id. The Court found that the
government's interest in enacting the ordinances substantially advanced a legitimate
state goal and that enacting the ordinances was a proper exercise of the City's police
powers to protect its residents from the ill effects of urbanization. Id. at 262-63.

restriction on property.' By their nature, however, seizures of, and restraints on, property that is later returned to the owner may constitute
temporary rather than permanent takings. As discussed more fully in Part
III, there is a wide range of circumstances in forfeiture cases in which
the Government assumes temporary control over property. 7 If the property is damaged or otherwise loses value during that time, the Fifth
Amendment "taking," if any, is at most a temporary one.
The Supreme Court addressed the temporary takings issue in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.' In First English, the Government relied upon flood control regulations to deny a property owner's development application.' In an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that an excessive land
use regulation, even though later abandoned by the government, may
require the payment of just compensation for the period the regulation
was in effect.6 The Court held that compensation is due for the period
of the regulation even if the Government later removes the regulatory
burden. 2 The measure of compensation for a temporary taking by the
Government is the value of the use of the property during the temporary
taking, or the amount the owner lost as a result of the taking.'
D.

The Expanded Takings Clause: Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan

Following Penn Central, the next major change in takings law occurred with the Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal
Commission.' In Nollan, the plaintiffs had applied for a permit to con-

56. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 183-285 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 271-77 and accompanying text.
59. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). See generally Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and
Ripeness in Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L REv. 1, 5 (1995).
60. First English, 482 U.S. at 304-08.
61. Id. at 319. In First English, the plaintiff owned land, located in a flood control
area, which it operated as a campground. Id. at 307. Following a flood that destroyed
the campground buildings, the county adopted an interim ordinance prohibiting any
construction or reconstruction of any building. Id. at 307-08. The plaintiff sued for
damages in an inverse condemnation action for the loss of the use of its property.
court granted the county's motion to strike the allegation from
Id. at 308. The trial
the complaint and the plaintiff appealed. Id. at 308-09. The California Court of Appeal
affirmed, and California Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. Id. at 310.
The United States Supreme Court held that, "While the typical taking occurs when
the government acts to condemn property in the exercise of its power of eminent
domain, the entire doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition
that a taking may occur without such formal proceedings." Id. at 316.
62. Id. at 319.
63. Id.
64. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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struct a new home on their beach-front property.' The California Coastal Commission agreed to issue the permit if the plaintiffs agreed to grant
the state a public access easement across a portion of the property.' In
an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court appeared to modify the Penn
Central approach by setting forth the threshold requirement that the
state, in order to prevail, must prove that the regulation substantially advances a legitimate state interest. 7 The Court made it clear that the
state's required showing is higher than the standard for upholding governmental action under substantive due process or equal protection theories in other contexts.' Applying this test to the facts before it, the
Court held that the state's asserted interests were not sufficiently related
to the burden placed on the property owners and that just compensation
was therefore required.' Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and
Stevens dissented.
Five years after Nollan, the Court continued to expand its view of the
circumstances under which just compensation is required. In Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,7 state land-use legislation prohibited
the construction of permanent habitable structures on the plaintiffs
coastal residential property. The South Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the owner's takings claim.73 The state supreme court found that,
under established United States Supreme Court precedent, a regulation
designed "to prevent serious public harm does not give rise to a takings
claim regardless of the effect on the property's value."74 Because the
regulations prevented harmful coastal development, no compensation
was required."
In a six-to-two decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court reversed
the dismissal of the action. Rejecting the lower court's reading of the

65. Id. at 828.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 834 n.3. The commission argued legitimate state interests based upon
"protecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming
the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and
preventing congestion on the public beaches." Id. at 835.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 841-42.
70. Id. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
72. Id. at 2889.
73. Id. at 2890.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2902. Lucas has produced a substantial amount of commentary. See

"harmful and noxious uses" doctrine, the Court adopted a rule requiring
just compensation in two circumstances: (1) where the property owner
has suffered "a physical invasion of [the] property," or (2) where the
state "regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests'" or "denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land."" The Court found that Lucas fell within the latter category because the regulations denied him all economically beneficial use of his
land."8
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy focused on the relief to
which Lucas was entitled." The regulations at issue had been amended
after the suit was filed to allow landowners such as Lucas to apply for
construction permits.' Therefore, any taking of Lucas's property was
potentially only a temporary taking.' Justice Kennedy noted that
tempo8 2
rary takings, like permanent takings, require just compensation.

generally, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the
Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council on Wetlands and Coastal BarrierBeaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L.REV. 1 (1995)
(arguing that the infusion of common law principles into the takings analysis has
expanded the harmful or noxious use doctrine and may make it easier for the government to defeat takings claims by landowners); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven
Deadly Sins of Takings Law, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LY. LA.
L REv. 955 (1993) (stating that courts are "unable to break free of the implicit assumption that any coherent account of the Takings Clause has to allow the political
process of land use planning, and, more generally, of economic planning to go forward more or less as it has"); William W. Fisher, III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45
STAN. L REV. 1393 (1993) ("The nuisance exception that the Court builds into its new
test will contribute to the already infamous vagueness of the takings doctrine and
may lead to inconsistency in the vulnerability of similar tracts of land to sever landuse regulation."); Richard Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 1411 (1993) ("Lucas likely signals the emergence of a talings analysis that is
more receptive to environmental concerns."); Laura McKnight, Regulatory Takings:
Sorting Out Supreme Court Standards After Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
41 KAN. L.REV. 615 (1993) (stating that the Supreme Court "has far to go before its
regulatory takings doctrine will be developed well enough to accommodate the complexities of modern land use regulation, but Lucas is a step in the right direction);
James W. Sanderson & Ann Mesmer, A Review of Regulatory Takings After Lucas, 70
DENY. U. L.REV. 497 (1993) ("Now that Lucas has been decided, the claims court
has a mandate to continue issuing decisions that take less account of legitimate state
interests in regulating and more account of a loss in an owner's property value resulting from that regulation.").
77. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2893-94.
78. Id. at 2901.
79. Id. at 2902 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
81. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 2902 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987)).
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Where a property owner does not fall into Lucas's per se rule, the
holding seems to indicate that the earlier, ad hoc balancing test remains
in place.' Post-Lucas, courts continue to apply the Penn Central factors.'
In its 1994 decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard,' the Supreme Court
further refined the Lucas approach. The Court, led by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, again found an uncompensated taking of property in circumstances where the Court arguably would earlier have held that no compensation was required.
Pursuant to a state-wide land use management program enacted in
Oregon in 1991, the City of Tigard adopted a Community Development
Code (CDC) requiring property owners in the central business district to
maintain fifteen percent of their property as open space.' The city also
enacted a drainage plan designed to combat flood risks. Florence
Dolan owned a plumbing and electrical supply store within the central
business district and within a floodplain.'
When Dolan applied for a permit to expand her store, the city responded by conditioning the permit upon dedication of a portion of the property for improvement of a storm drainage system and an additional portion
as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.' The city found that the required dedication was justified by the need to offset increased automobile traffic to
the expanded store and the need to accounodate increased runoff that
would result from the expansion.'
Dolan filed a series of administrative and judicial appeals from the
city's decision, arguing that the required dedications were not justified by
the proposed expansion of the store and therefore constituted a compen-

83. Id. at 2895 n.8 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978)).
84. It is not clear on the face of Lucas that the Penn Central test continues to

apply. Courts, however, have continued to rely on the latter case. See, e.g., In re
Chateaugay, 163 B.R. 955, 960-61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986), and denying a claim that governmentimposed restrictions on pension funds require just compensation), affd, 53 F.3d 478
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 298 (1995).
85. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
86. Id. at 2312.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2314.
90. Id. at 2314-15.

sable taking under the Fifth Amendment.' Ultimately, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the required dedication, finding that the city had
shown that the dedication was "reasonably related" to the city's goals
2
and that such a showing sufficed under Nollan."
The Oregon Supreme
Court found that both the drainage and pathway dedications were reasonably related to the impact of the business' expansion. 3
As it had in Nollan and Lucas, the Court again focused on the purpose
of the Takings Clause: "to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."' Once again, the attempt to force the
property owner to allow public access to her property constituted a substantial infringement on property rights."5
At this point, the Court modified its previous approach. The Court
acknowledged that the city had proven the "essential" nexus between the
governmental goals and the restrictions on property use as required by
Nollan.' The Court went on, however, to establish an additional test to
be met by the Government: "The second part of our analysis requires us
to determine whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's
permit conditions bear the required relationship to the projected impact
of petitioner's proposed development."97
Next, the Court analyzed tests used by other courts to determine
whether the Government has met its burden." The Court rejected approaches that either would grant extreme deference to the governmental
findings or would require a "very exacting correspondence."' The Court
found that "a term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what
we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment."'" The Court
went on to note that "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required,
but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that
the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact
of the proposed development."' Under this test, the Court found that
the city's findings were too generalized and imprecise to pass constitutional muster. °2
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2315 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 442 (Or. 1993), rev'd,
114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2316 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2318.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2319.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2319-20.
102. Id. at 2321-22; see also Kristen P. Sosnosky, Note, Dolan v. City of Tigard- A
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As discussed more fully in Part III, Dolan's "rough proportionality" test
may be implicated where the Government has assumed control of property under federal forfeiture statutes."u Before analyzing that question,
Part II sets forth the modern bases for governmental seizures and forfeitures of private property."n
II.

THE LAW OF SEIZURES AND FORFEITURES

Congress has adopted an array of civil and criminal forfeiture statutes
designed to give law enforcement an additional tool. 5 These statutes
provide for the pretrial seizure and ultimate forfeiture of the instrumentalities and proceeds of criminal activities. Forfeitures have been muchlauded as a means to deprive criminals of the fruits of their activities and
as a deterrent to further crimes," and also produce substantial revenues for the Department of Justice." Nonetheless, in the wake of substantial critical commentary from Congress, defense counsel, and academics,"u courts have begun to place severe constitutional restrictions
Sequel to Nollan's Essential Nexus Test for Regulatory Takings, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1677
(1995) (analyzing the development of the rough proportionality standard as a logical
extension of takings doctrine); Christopher J. St. Jeanos, Note, Dolan v. Tigard and
the Rough Proportionality Test: Roughly Speaking, Why Isn't a Nexus Enough?, 63
FORDHAM L REV. 1883 (1995) (analyzing the rough proportionality test as a constitutional necessity).
103. See infra notes 244-57 and accompanying text
104. See infra notes 105-82 and accompanying text.
105. For an overview of the law relating to seizures and forfeitures, see generally
DIANA PARKER & J.

KELLY STRADER, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL FORFEITURES in

WHITE COLLAR

CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES 6A (Otto G. Obermaier & Robert G.
Morvillo, eds. 1995); Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War
on Drugs, 83 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 274 (1992) (stating that forfeitures under
§ 881 "constitute criminal punishment and should not be permitted" unless the Government can prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt); Michael F. Zeldin & Roger
G. Weiner, Innocent Third Parties and Their Rights in Forfeiture Proceedings, 28
AM. CRIM. L REV. 843 (1991) (discussing the threat of forfeiture to lenders); Jay A.
Rosenberg, Note, Constitutional Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 CoLUM. L
REV. 390 (1988) (arguing for constitutional protections in some cases, such as a right
to appointed counsel and use immunity, for those accused of criminal violations and
whose property is subject to forfeiture); Michael Schecter, Note, Fear and Loathing
and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CORNELL L REV. 1151 (1990) (arguing that "forfeiture is
criminal penalty and that claimants are entitled to criminal due process protections").
106. Id.
107. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 502 n.2
(1993) (noting the substantial role that revenues from forfeiture play in meeting the
Department of Justice's annual budget).
108. See, e.g., Stanley S. Arkin, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness and Big-Bang Statutes,

on the scope of and procedures for seizures and forfeitures."° After reviewing the history of and current statutory bases for seizures and forfeitures,"' this section discusses current constitutional restrictions on
those governmental actions."' It is in this context that claims under the
Takings Clause will arise in the coming years.
A.

HistoricalBackground
1. Common Law

Forfeitures have a lengthy history."2 Under both common law and
modem statutes, the primary distinction is between criminal forfeiture,
an in personam proceeding against a criminal defendant, and civil forfeiture, an in rem proceeding brought against the property itself."' Under
English common law, defendants convicted of felonies or treason lost all
their property through in personam forfeitures"' as part of the criminal
penalty."5 The English common law also provided for in rem forfeitures."6 For example, under the doctrine of "deodand," property that
caused the accidental death of a King's subject was forfeited."7 In rem

N.Y.L.J., June 10, 1993, at 3; John C. Coffee, Jr., Is Innocence Irrelevant? Under RICO, Trials Have Become Secondary, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 13, 1989, at 20; John Conyers,
Jr., Conyers on Asset-Forfeiture Abuses, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at 43.
109. See in~fra part ll.C.2.
110. See infra notes 112-57.
111. See in~fra notes 158-82 and accompanying text.
112. For instance, some argue that forfeiture is rooted in the Bible. See Rosenberg,
supra note 105, at 390-91; Zeldin & Weiner, supra note 105, at 843. Both articles argue that Exodus 21:28, which states in particular that, "Ifan ox gores a man or a
woman and they die, then the ox shall be stoned and his flesh not eaten; but the
owner of the ox shall be quit," provides for forfeiture.
113. See infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
114. Mark A. Jankowski, Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L REV. 165, 171 n.33
(1990). Article Il of the U.S. Constitution limits in personam forfeitures in connection
with the crime of treason. U.S. CONST. art. IH, § 3, cl.2. Another type of in personam forfeiture in early English common law was attainder. See Craig W. Palm, RICO
Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When Is Everything Too Much?, 53 U. Prrr.
L.REV. 1, 7 (1991) ("Attainder was a legal state into which a convicted defendant
was thrust by operation of law upon his conviction of a capital offense like treason
or felony. Attainder was no part of the common law sentence; rather, it was an automatic consequence of that sentence.").
115. Forfeiture of an estate after a treason conviction, however, was proscribed in
the United States by Article III of the United States Constitution. Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
116. Id. at 682.

117. See id. at 681 n.16. "Deodand", taken from the Latin Deo dandum (to be given
to God), has its roots in practices in biblical and pre-biblical times. Id. at 681. Under
deodand, the property itself was "guilty;" the owner's guilt or innocence was irrele-
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forfeiture of goods and vessels used in violation of customs and revenue
laws was also permitted in England" and has always existed in the
United States,"9 pursuant to English and local laws.20 After independence, such forfeitures were authorized by federal law. 2'
In all these in rem forfeiture proceedings, the establishment of the
guilt or innocence of the property owner was not a prerequisite or defense.'22 The guilty object was the nominal defendant in the case, and
vant. See Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46
TEMP. L.Q. 169, 181-83 (1973). The rationale was partly akin to restitution, with the
money intended to be used for prayer for the victim's soul or for other charitable
purpose. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681. Deodand was also premised on the notion
that the instrument was capable of future harm and should be destroyed. See Palm,
supra note 114, at 8. For a discussion of in rem forfeitures in early American jurisprudence, see Jankowski, supra note 114, at 171-78.
118. There are sources that "trace the origin of forfeiture distinctions to an independently developed British admiralty law." Stahl, supra note 105, at 295. Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., "attributed admiralty forfeiture to the motion of the ships through water"
and "concluded that the object's 'motion' creates the liability." Schecter, supra note
105, at 1153 (quoting OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 25-30 (1923)).
119. The transplanting of forfeitures to the New World did not always proceed
smoothly. See Schecter, supra note 105, at 1154.
When the Crown was unable to extract desired tariff payments through criminal sanctions via jury trials, it threatened the colonies with the use of forfeitures and juryless admiralty proceedings. Although the Continental Congress
complained about England's abuses of admiralty proceedings in the Declaration of Independence, the United States Congress had fewer qualms about
its own use of the procedure.
Id. at 1154-55. Congress also adopted the practice of shifting the burden of proof to
property owners in customs law in rem forfeitures. See Peter Petrou, Comment, Due
Process Implications of Shifting the Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Proceedings Arising out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984 DUKE L.J. 822, 825-26 (1984).
120. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682 (citing 3 WILLAM S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 68-71 (3d ed. 1927); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 351 (2d ed. 1909)). Although each American colony had its
own forfeiture law, the English Crown did demand that all colonies adhere to the
British Navigation Acts, enacted in the mid-seventeenth century, which could be either in personam or in rem proceedings. See Palm, supra note 114, at 9.
121. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683 (citing C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133,
145-148 (1943)); Lalit K. Loomba, Comment, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real
Property Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58
FORDHAM L REV. 471, 472 (1989) ("Although many of the present day characteristics
of civil forfeiture law and procedure may be traced to origins in the early stages of
English common law, the forfeiture of both real and personal property is based exclusively on statutory authority.").
122. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684 (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1

its offense against the law was the critical factor. Thus, for example, "the
statutory forfeiture of a vessel found to have been engaged in piratical
'
conduct" was upheld as early as1 21844,
3 even though the innocence of
4
established."
"fully
was
the owner
2.

Modem Proceedings and Trends

Modem forfeiture statutes have eclipsed the common law bases for
forfeiture.'25 Forfeitures are now justified to prevent further illicit use of
the property, to render illegal behavior unprofitable by imposing a harsh
economic penalty,' 6 and to induce innocent owners "to exercise greater
care in transferring possession of their property."' 27 As discussed more
fully below, current statutes provide both for the forfeiture of property
necessary to the commission of an offense and of property only marginally connected to a crime.'
B.

Statutory Bases for Seizures, Restraints, and Forfeitures
Forfeitures arise in both the civil and criminal contexts."

Like com-

(1827)).
123. Id. at 684. The United States formally adopted in rem forfeiture of vessels in
1789, with the Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 36. See Elizabeth A. Skorcz, Comment, RICO Forfeiture: Secured Lenders Beware, 37 UCLA L. REv. 1199, 1204 (1990).
124. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684 (citing United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 210, 238 (1844)).
125. For instance, "[a]s many as seventy years ago, in rem forfeiture was seen as a
'worn out fiction' derived from the 'superstitious' belief that a physical object has a
power or personality capable of guilt. Today, in ren forfeiture is used as a powerful
method for attacking drug felony violations." Ron Champoux, Note, Real Property
Forfeiture Under Federal Drug Laws: Does the Punishment Outweigh the Crime?, 20
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247, 250 (1992).
126. "In particular, civil forfeiture schemes have been increasingly employed in the
'war on drugs.'" Stahl, supra note 105, at 274.
Most civil forfeitures directed at drug activity occur under the aegis of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 [Section
881] . .. which permits the forfeiture of all profits from the drug trade . . .
all assets purchased with such proceeds [and] ...
assets intended to be
given in exchange for controlled substance, allowing for forfeiture of property
never actually involved with illegal activities.
Id. at 275-76.
127. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688.
128. While both state and federal governments insist that the expanding scope of
forfeitures is unrelated to raising revenue, the explosive use of forfeiture statutes
arouses the suspicion that there is a new motivation for the use of forfeitures. See
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 504 (1993).
129. "The forfeiture provision of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, along with the analogous provision in [the Racketeer Influenced
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mon law civil forfeitures, modem civil forfeiture statutes, such as those
provided for in the federal narcotics,"'3 currency transaction reporting, '31 and money laundering'32 statutes, are in rem proceedings directed at the property itself."n The alleged wrongdoer is not named as a
party to the action and need not have been convicted or even indicted
for the property to be forfeited."' Criminal forfeitures, on the other
hand, are provided as part of the penalty imposed upon conviction."n
1. Civil Seizures and Forfeitures
Section 981 of the Federal Criminal Code"u and § 881 of the Federal
Food and Drugs Code'37 provide the basis for most civil forfeiture proceedings. Under § 981,"n "[any property, real or personal," that is involved in or traceable to crimes relating to currency transaction reporting and money laundering is forfeitable." Furthermore, any property

and Corrupt Organizations Act], was the first modem criminal forfeiture provision
enacted by Congress." Sean D. Smith, Comment, The Scope of Real Property Forfeiture for Drug-Related Crimes Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 137 U. PA. L
REV. 303, 314 (1988).
130. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
132. Id. § 1956 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

133. "In the United States today, over 100 federal statutes provide for in rem forfeiture." Skorcz, supra note 123, at 1204.
134. Id. at 1204.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "The legislative history of RICO indicates that Congress considered criminal forfeiture a novel form of punishment."
Skorcz, supra note 123, at 1206 (in personam forfeiture "deprives the racketeer of
property acquired through an illegal activity" and it separates "the violator from illgotten gains, . . . prevent[ing] the violator both from delegating criminal activities to
a colleague while in prison and from resuming the activities once the violator has
served his criminal sentence").
136. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
137. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Congress enacted § 881, part of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, to help "strengthen
existing law enforcement authority in the field of drug abuse . . . through providing
more effective means for law enforcement aspects of drug abuse prevention and
control." H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.AN. 4566, 4566-67 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988)).
138. Money Laundering Prosecution Improvement Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-690,
§ 6463, 102 Stat. 4374, 4734 (1988) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 981).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A). The transaction must violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 (1988
& Supp. V 1993) (money laundering), 1957 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (same) or 31
U.S.C. §§ 5313(a) (1988) (requiring reporting of monetary transactions), 5324(a) (1988

that is derived from, or is traceable to proceeds of specified financial
crimes is also forfeitable. 4 ° Section 881 renders all proceeds from and
instrumentalities of controlled substance transactions, including both real
and personal property, subject to seizure and forfeiture.''
These statutes also provide for the pretrial seizure of potentially forfeitable property.'
The procedures for such seizures are extremely
complex, but in general terms and subject to the limitations discussed
below, the Government may seize property without a judicial determination, upon a showing of probable cause that the property is forfeitable.' At the forfeiture trial, once the Government has established

& Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting structuring transactions to avoid reporting requirements),
to cause a forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 981; see iqfra note 152 and accompanying text.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). The specified underlying statutes are 18 U.S.C. §§ 215
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), 218 (1988), 656 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), 657 (1988 & Supp. V
1993), 1005-07 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), 1014 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), 1032 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), 1344 (1988 & Supp. V 1992), and those affecting a financial institution,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
141. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) provides:
(a) Subject property
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a
controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to
such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities
used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter,
except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent
of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by
that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or
consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988). Section 881(a)(7) provides for the forfeiture of:
All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances
or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or
part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, except that no
property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest
of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that
owner.
Id. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
142. See supra note 141.
143. See generaUy PARKER & STRADER, supra note 105, at § 6A.02[2][A].
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probable cause, the burden of
proof shifts
45
prove "innocent" ownership.'
2.

44

to an intervening owner to

Criminal Restraints and Forfeitures

Criminal forfeiture statutes provide for in personam proceedings that
are part of a criminal defendant's punishment. 4 ' Some of the primary
federal criminal forfeiture statutes are § 982 of the Federal Criminal
Code relating to financial crimes,'47 § 1963 of the RICO statute,'" and

144. "The practice of shifting burden of proof onto property owners in an in rem
forfeiture first appeared in seventeenth-century England when Parliament passed the
Navigation Acts." Petrou, supra note 119, at 825. "Prior to the Navigation Acts, the
Crown had to prove the guilt of the owner." Id. This practice received early acceptance in the United States Supreme Court in Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 339 (1813), in which the Court "refused to interpret the government's burden
to show probable cause in a forfeiture proceeding as requiring it to prove the elements of a prima facia case." Id. Chief Justice Marshall viewed it as a "legitimate
exercise of the legislative power to mandate judicial procedure." Id.
145. Sections 881(a)(6) and (7) each provide that: "no property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act
or omission established by the owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge or consent of that owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)-(7) (1988) (emphasis added). The innocent owner defense of § 981 provides that: "[n]o property shall be forfeited under this section to the extent of the interest of an owner or lienholder by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner or lienholder to have been
committed without the knowledge of that owner or lienholder." 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)

(emphasis added).
146. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974) (providing an overview of the history of criminal forfeitures); Jankowski, supra note 114,
at 171 n.33.
147. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), provides, inter alia:
(b) (1) Property subject to forfeiture under this section, any seizure and
disposition thereof, and any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation
thereto, shall be governed(A) in the case of a forfeiture under subsection (a)(1) of this section,
by subsections (c) and (e) through (p) of section 413 of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853); and
(B) in the case of a forfeiture under subsection (a)(2) of this section,
by subsections (b), (c), (e), and (g) through (p) of section 413 of such Act.
18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 provides, inter alia:
(b) Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section includes(1) real property including things growing on, affixed to, and found
in land; and
(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privi-

§ 853 of the federal drug laws."'
Under § 982,150 property involved in or traceable to an offense in violation of the currency transaction reporting and money laundering criminal statutes is forfeitable.'5 ' Property constituted of or derived from
proceeds of specified financial crimes is also deemed forfeitable. 52 Section 982(a)(1) permits forfeiture of property "involved in" an offense, or
merely traceable to such tainted property."n Under 21 U.S.C. § 1963 the
defendant also forfeits broad categories of property if he is convicted
under the RICO laws." Finally, under § 853, upon conviction of a viola-

leges, interests, claims, and securities.
(c) All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a)
vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred
to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict
of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States,
unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (1) that
he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of
purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was
subject to forfeiture under this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (b), (c) (1988).
149. 21 U.S.C. § 853 provides, inter alia:
(a) Property subject to criminal forfeiture
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II
of this' chapter punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall
forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(c) Third party transfers
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of
this section vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving
rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such property that is subsequently
transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a
special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the
United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) of this section that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such
property who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section.
21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
150. The property subject to forfeiture pursuant to § 982(a) is: "[A]ny property, real
or personal, involved" in the proscribed offense, or "any property traceable to such
property." 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(4) (Supp. V 1993).
151. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a) (1988), 5324 (Supp. V 1993); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
153. 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Sections 1956 and 1957, dealing
with money laundering, also are implicated. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957. The
property subject to forfeiture under § 1963(a) is:

[Vol. 23: 449, 1996]

Forfeitures and Just Compensation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

tion of the federal narcotics laws, broad categories of property are forfeitable."

As with civil forfeitures, the criminal forfeiture statutes allow

(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation
of Section 1962.

(2 ) any -

(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source
of influence over any enterprise which the person has established,
operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of,
in violation of Section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which
the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity
or unlawful debt collection in violation of Section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1), (2) (1988).
Apart from the RICO enterprise, any property acquired, maintained, or derived
through racketeering, may be forfeitable under § 1963(a)(1) or (3) upon a finding that
the defendant would not have obtained the property "but for" the criminal offense. See
United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1365 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S., 810
(1989); United States v. Regan, 699 F. Supp. 36, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The "but for" test
also appears to apply to forfeitures under § 1963(a)(3). Cf. United States v. Bucuvalas,
970 F.2d 937, 947 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that forfeiture provisions are to be construed
liberally), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169,
1213 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990); United States v. Horak, 833
F.2d 1235, 1243 (7th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. One 1980 BMW 320, 559 F.
Supp. 382, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (same).
155. This section provides for forfeiture of property used to "facilitate" a drug offense. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2) (1988). Section 853 was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-323, 98 Stat. 1976,
2040-57 (1984). The statute was enacted "to enhance the use of forfeiture, and, in
particular, the sanction of criminal forfeiture, as a law enforcement tool in combatting . . . racketeering and drug trafficking." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374.
The property subject to forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) is far broader
than that covered by its civil counterpart, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a):
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation;
and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall forfeit,
in addition to any property described in paragraph (1) or (2), any of his interest in, claims against, and property or contractual rights affording a source
of control over the continuing criminal enterprise.

for pretrial restraint of the assets."
In sum, the federal civil and criminal forfeiture statutes provide the
Government with extraordinary powers over private property. Until recently, federal courts have been hesitant to limit those powers and have
yielded to the Government's stated law enforcement goals. Since 1993,
however, the United States Supreme Court has substantially altered the
landscape of constitutional law in the forfeiture context.'57
C.

ConstitutionalLimitations on Seizures and Forfeitures
1.

The Hands-Off Approach

For years, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts
declined to place substantial restrictions on the scope of forfeitures. The
United States Supreme Court decision in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co.,' was the foundation for this approach. In that case, the
owner of a pleasure yacht leased the property to persons allegedly involved in narcotics activity."9 After the Government obtained forfeiture
of the yacht, the owner brought a claim for compensation."' The Court
held that seizure of the property without notice or a hearing did not
violate due process because notice might have made it possible to hide
or destroy the property."' The Court also rejected the owners' just
compensation claim.'

156. Under § 853(e)(2), and § 1963(d)(2), a court may enter a pre-indictment temporary restraining order (TRO), without notice or a hearing, upon a showing of probable cause that, if there were a conviction, the property would be subject to forfeiture and that notice would jeopardize the availability of the property. 21 U.S.C. § 853
(1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2) (1988). The procedures under 21 U.S.C. § 853 also apply to forfeitures under 18 U.S.C. § 982. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1) (Supp V 1993).
Under 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(e)(1)(B), 18 U.S.C. §§ 982(b)(1), 1963(d)(1)(B), a court may
enter a TRO upon notice and a finding that there is a "substantial probability that
the United States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture," and that the government's
need outlays any hardship on the opposing party. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B) (1988); 18
U.S.C. §§ 982(b)(1), 1963(d)(1)(B) (1988). After indictment, all three authorize the
court to enter a "restraining order or injunction," to require a bond, or to "take any
other action to preserve [the property]." 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 982(h)(1), 1963(d)(1)(B) (1988).
157. See infra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
158. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
159. Id. at 665.
160. Id. at 668.
161. Id. at 678-80. The Court held that, "in limited circumstances, immediate seizure
of a property interest, without an opportunity for prior hearing, is constitutionally
permissible." Id. at 678. The Court found that the instant situation was analogous to
those "extraordinary" situations in which postponement of notice and a hearing until
after the seizure does not offend due process. Id. at 680.
162. Id.
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Relying primarily on Cdlero-Toledo, numerous courts rejected both due
process'63 and Eighth Amendment challenges to civi' 6 4 and
criminal" forfeitures. In this context, the Supreme Court's recent willingness to invoke constitutional provisions to strike down forfeitures is
all the more remarkable.
2.

The New Vulnerability of Forfeiture Laws

The Supreme Court's newly-adopted constraints on forfeitures have
arisen both under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. On the procedural side, the
Court in James Daniel Good Real Property," for the first time, limited
the Government's ability to seize property pursuant to forfeiture statutes
without notice.'6 7 Because the property in that case was real property,
the Court reasoned, there were no exigent circumstances such as those

in Calero-Toledo that might justify a seizure without notice."6 Although

163. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Monsanto, declined to decide whether
a hearing is required before property can be restrained prior to trial. 491 U.S. 600,
615 n.10 (1989); see United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d 1376,
1383 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (rejecting the due process challenge
to forfeitures); United States v. 141st St. Corp. by Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 876 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); United States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch
Nisku, 548 F.2d 8, 11 n.4 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. One 1978 Chrysler LeBaron
Station Wagon, 648 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
164. See, e.g., United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1992),
rev'd sub. nom., Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. All
Tract 686.64 Acres of Property, 820 F. Supp. 1433, 1439 (M.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that
the state has title upon showing probable cause and that defendant must subsequently prove innocence to avoid forfeiture).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 38 (2d Cir.) (holding that forfeiture of real property did not violate the Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
166. 114 S. Ct 492 (1993).
167. Id. at 505 (holding that the delayed notice and hearing were not justified by
any important government needs).
168. Id. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice O'Connor rejected the
majority's holding that the government must give notice and a hearing before seizing
any real property prior to forfeiture. Id. at 511 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor cited Calero-Toledo and its progeny as clearly indicating that due process does not require a hearing prior to seizing items that are
subject to forfeiture. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"Those cases reflect the common sense notion that the property owner receives all
the process that is due at the forfeiture proceeding itself." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

limited on its face to seizures of real property, this decision indicates the
Court's new willingness to protect procedural rights in the forfeiture context.
Even more significantly, in Alexander v. United States,'" and in Austin v. United States,' the Court held for the first time that criminal
and civil forfeitures are subject to the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause. 7 ' The Austin decision is particularly important because
the vast majority of courts, with a few notable exceptions,'" had previously indicated that "civil" forfeitures are beyond the purview of the
protections that the Eighth Amendment affords individuals in criminal
proceedings. "

169. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
170. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
171. See id. at 2803; Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
172. See United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289,
1299 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (noting that constitutional issues could
arise when property is seized in civil forfeiture actions), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 809
(1991); United States v. 4492 South Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1270 (2d Cir. 1989)
(dicta).
173. United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 400 (3d Cir.
1990) (reasoning that Congress can legitimately seize property as a civil penalty); On
Leong, 918 F.2d at 1296 (reiterating that the remedial nature of civil suits precludes
Eighth Amendment implication); United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 235 (9th
Cir. 1988) (maintaining the inapplicability of the Eighth Amendment in civil forfeiture
actions), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989); United States v. 250 Kreag Rd., 739 F.
Supp. 120, 124 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that courts generally hold that civil enactments preclude findings of Eighth Amendment violations); United States v. 1213 34th
St., No. 89-2401 (JHG), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3226, *8 (D.D.C. 1991) ("Although some
constitutional protections extend to civil forfeitures proceedings, they are few and the
Eighth Amendment's proscriptions are not among them.").
Courts had declined to apply the Eighth Amendment to criminal forfeitures. See
United States v. Monroe, 866 F.2d 1357, 1367 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the punishment was not sufficiently severe to invoke the Eighth Amendment); United States
v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980), and cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that RICO forfeiture does not violate the Eighth Amendment because the
statute correlates the amount of a forfeiture to the defendant's interest in the enterprise), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). But see United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d
1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that trial court must insure that the size of the
forfeiture and the gravity of the offense are proportionate); United States v.
Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1987) (asserting that the trial court is responsible for insuring that forfeiture is not excessive punishment); Grande, 620 F.2d at
1039 (remanding for evaluation under the Eighth Amendment because the amount of
illegal proceeds was a fraction of the enterprise forfeited); United States v. Regan,
726 F. Supp. 447, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (overturning criminal forfeiture on Eighth
Amendment grounds), affd in part and vacated in part, 937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.),
amended, 946 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 940 (1992); United
States v. Robinson, 721 F. Supp. 1541, 1543-45 (D.R.I. 1989) (same).
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In Austin, the claimant had pleaded guilty to possession of two grams
of cocaine with intent to distribute.7 4 The Government had alleged that
the defendant arranged the narcotics sale at his automobile body shop,
went to his mobile home, and returned with the cocaine. 75' Police later
discovered drug paraphernalia, small amounts of marijuana and cocaine,
and $4,700 in cash in the home and the body shop. 7' The government
then sought and obtained forfeiture of the property under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).'
The Eighth Circuit rejected Austin's proportionality claim, holding that
the Eighth Amendment does not apply where the government proceeds
in rem against property. 78 The court stated that it was bound by the
technical distinction between civil and criminal proceedings, and also by
"clear court decisions that the Constitution does not require proportionality-at least, not in civil proceedings for the forfeiture of property."7 '
The unanimous Supreme Court decision reversing the Eighth Circuit is,
therefore, startling. The Court reviewed the history of civil forfeitures
and found that these proceedings have been designed, at least in part, to
punish the wrongdoer."n The Court held that the Eighth Amendment is
not limited to criminal proceedings but extends to civil fines where those
fines are intended, at least in part, to punish. 8'
In its recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has sent clear
signals that it is prepared to scrutinize carefully both civil and criminal
forfeiture proceedings. After years of virtually unfettered use by the government, courts are likely, in coming years, to limit civil and criminal

174. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
175. Id. at 2803.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 818 (1992), rev'd, Austin V. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
180. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
181. Id. As Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence, this conclusion is highly
suspect. Id. at 2815 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy observed that neither
the cases nor the commentary present a unified theory that forfeitures are always
rationalized as a personal punishment against the owner. "Some impositions of in rem
forfeiture may have been designed either to remove property that was itself causing
injury, or to give the court jurisdiction over an asset that it could control in order to
make injured parties whole. . . . Id. at 2812 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omit-

ted).

forfeitures as never before." It is in this context that the takings issue
should be evaluated.
III.

A.

SEIZURES, FORFEITURES, AND COMPENSABLE TAKINGS

Takings Cases in the Forfeiture Context

Although some commentators have suggested that the Takings Clause
should provide a basis for claims in the forfeiture context,"n there are
relatively few such cases where courts have awarded just compensation.
Yet, as the Government has become more aggressive in its forfeiture
efforts, the courts have come to scrutinize forfeitures more carefully
under the Takings Clause. Before turning to possible applications of the
Takings Clause to seizures and forfeitures, this Section analyzes earlier
forfeiture cases.
1.

Calero-Toledo's Takings Analysis

For many years, courts relied upon the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Calero-Toledo to reject takings claims in forfeiture cases.'
In that case, the innocent lessors of a pleasure yacht used for narcotics
trafficking sought just compensation for their property."l In rejecting
the claim, the Supreme Court stated that the Government has the power

182. It is already clear that the Supreme Court's new approach will affect lower
courts' approaches in areas beyond those addressed in the Court's decisions. For example, three circuit courts, relying upon Austin, have found that the concurrent imposition of civil forfeiture and criminal punishment may violate the Double Jeopardy
clause. See United States v. Perez, No. 94-60788 (5th Cir. Nov. 21, 1995); United
States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir. 1995); -United States v. $405,089.23 in
United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994), amended on denial of
reh'g, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995). But see United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("Congress may impose multiple punishments for a single crime without
violating the Constitution's double jeopardy restrictions."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922
(1994); United States v. 18755 North Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (l1th Cir. 1994)
(stating that civil forfeiture was not barred on double jeopardy grounds because the
criminal and civil proceedings fall "within the contours of a single, coordinated prosecution").
183. See, e.g., Damon G. Saltzburg, Note, Real Property Forfeitures as a Weapon in
the Government's War on Drugs: A Failure to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72
B.U. L. REv. 217, 237-38 (1992) (suggesting that the Takings Clause may provide a
means for compensating innocent owners); Jane Rohrer, Note, What Price Investor
Confidence? RICO Abuse as Compensable Takings, 66 S. CAL L REV. 1675 (1993)
(suggesting that forfeitures later overturned in the RICO context may require just
compensation).
184. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974).
185. Id. at 665-66.
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to seize and obtain the forfeiture of property under its police powers.'"
Because the property at issue was properly forfeited pursuant to those
powers, no taking occurred.' 7 Further, the Court found that the
owner's innocence did not require just compensation because the property itself was considered the wrongdoer." The Court, however, also remarked that if an owner of an interest in real property proved "not only
that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also
that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property... it would be difficult to conclude that
forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive. " "
In the years following Calero-Toledo, the vast majority of courts relied
upon that case to reject takings claims in the forfeiture context.'9 So
long as the statutory innocent owner provisions are followed, the requirements of Calero-Toledo are met and no taking has occurred. 9'
At least with respect to the takings issue, the Calero-Toledo holding
has lost much of its force. First, in that case the Court adopted the common law assumption that forfeitures operate only against the property as
wrongdoer and not against the owner." As discussed above, the deci-

186. Id. at 686.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 683-88.
189. Id. at 689-90.
190. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 614-16 (1989) (rejecting forfeiture challenge on due process grounds); United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 971 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993); United
States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku, 548 F.2d 8, 11 n.4 (1st Cir. 1977). CaleroToledo is relied on in cases of civil forfeitures. See, e.g., United States v. 508 Depot
St., 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801
(1993); United States v. All Tract 686.64 Acres of Property, 820 F. Supp. 1433, 1438
(M.D. Ga. 1993). The case is similarly applied in criminal forfeiture cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1989).
Some courts, however, required just compensation or return of property when an
owner was not only innocent, but also took the requisite precautions to ensure that
the property was not misused. See, e.g., United States v. One 1981 Datsun 280ZX, 644
F. Supp. 1280, 1288 (E.D. Pa. 1986); United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette,
477 F. Supp. 32, 35 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462
F. Supp. 1383, 1392 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
191. See United States v. 1213 34th Street, No. 89-2401 (JHG), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3226, at *18 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that a mortgage holder had no claim under the
takings clause because the "government is required by statute and regulations to
compensate innocent mortgage holders").
192. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683-688.

sions in Austin and Alexander make clear that the Court is no longer
willing to accept that common -law fiction.'93
Second, lower court cases make clear that there are instances where
the innocent owner provisions are simply not sufficient to protect a
property owner from governmental overreaching.'94 For example, if
property loses value or is destroyed, "return" of the property to an innocent owner does not make the owner whole.
Finally, in the years since Calero-Toledo, the Court has reaffirmed the
Pennsylvania Coal holding that governmental exercises of its police
powers may require just compensation.'95 A number of courts have relied upon Calero-Toledo and have stated that, because forfeitures are
effected by an exercise of the police power, they cannot give rise to
takings claims.'" On its face, however, Calero-Toledo recognizes the
possibility of takings claims in the forfeiture context.'97 In any event,
the Supreme Court has recognized since Pennsylvania Coal that an exercise of the police power can give rise to takings claims.' 8
2.

Valid Taldngs Claims in the Forfeiture Context

In light of the foregoing, courts have begun to award just compensation for seizures and forfeitures. Perhaps the first significant takings
decision in the forfeiture context is the Fourth Circuit's 1987 opinion in
In re Metmor Financial,Inc. '" In that case, the court held that an innocent mortgagee of seized property is entitled to interest payments
under the mortgage agreement while the Government holds the property.2" In so holding, the Metmor court relied upon Armstrong v. United

193. See supra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 271-77 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
196. See Perry v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 82, 85 (1993) (stating that forfeitures
further the purposes of the underlying criminal statutes); Eversleigh v. United States,
24 Cl. Ct. 357, 359 (1991) (stating that if property used in criminal activity is lawfully
forfeited, then the exercise of governmental authority is permissible); State ex rel.
Schrunk v. Metz, 867 P.2d 503, 508 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that properly exercised police power does not give rise to takings claim); Myers v. 1518 Holmes St.,
411 S.E.2d 209, 211 (S.C. 1991) (finding that forfeiture statutes further "punitive and
deterrent purposes" and are not unconstitutional).
197. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 669.
198. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) ("[Blasic understanding of the [Fifth] Amendment makes clear that it is designed ... to secure compensation in the event of
otherwise proper [police power] interference [with property] amounting to a taking.").
199. 819 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1987).
200. Id. at 451; see also United States v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 946 F.2d 264,
266 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that a mortgagee and a servicer of mortgages, as innocent lienholders, were "owners" whose interest in the property could not be forfeit-
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States. °' In Armstrong, the plaintiffs held liens enforceable only by attachment on property that was later transferred to the Government.2 °
Because United States property is immune from attachment, the transfer
affected the enforceability of the lien and not the lien itself.2°' The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation because their property interest had become unenforceable.2 °
The Fourth Circuit found that the mortgagee in Metmor was in a similar position to the Armstrong plaintiff because the mortgagee continued
to hold its mortgage rights.2 5 Because the mortgagor was a fugitive who
likely had no available assets, the mortgagee had no party other than the
Government against which to assert those rights.2 ' The holder of the
mortgage in Metmor, like the lienholders in Armstrong, was therefore entitled to just compensation.2"7
Six years after Metmor, the Federal Circuit issued another significant
ruling awarding just compensation in the forfeiture context. In its 1993
decision in Shelden v. United States,2° that court reversed the claims
court and held that the mortgagees of forfeited property were entitled to
just compensation.2' In Shelden, the property owner was convicted under RICO; 21 1 the Government filed a lis pendens, and in December 1983,
the district court entered a forfeiture order."' The mortgagees attempted to foreclose on the property when the mortgagors subsequently went
into arrears, but were unable to do so initially because the mortgagors

ed); Monroe Sav. Bank, FSB v. Catalano, 733 F. Supp. 595, 598 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (providing that "a mortgagee cannot be denied relief provided for under a mortgage
[agreement] because of conditions or circumstances not attributable to the mortgagee").
201. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
202. Id. at 41.
203. Id. at 42.
204. Id. at 46.
205. 819 F.2d at 450.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 451.
208. 7 F.3d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
209. Id. at 1031. But see Perry v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 82, 84 (1993) ("[T]he
Court of Federal Claims has rejected the notion that the seizure and administrative
forfeiture of money, pursuant to federal seizure and forfeiture statutes, is a compensable [F]ifth [A]mendment taking"); Eversleigh v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 357, 358
(1991) (finding no compensable Fifth Amendment taking in forfeiture case).
210. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
211. Shelden, 7 F.3d at 1024.

cured their default, and later because the mortgagors declared
bankruptcy." 2
Ultimately, following a reversal of the conviction and the entry of a
plea agreement, the Government in October 1990, abandoned its forfeiture efforts, gave the Sheldens a deed to the property, and released the
lis pendens."' In the interim, the property had suffered structural and
cosmetic damage."4 Plaintiffs sought compensation for the diminution
of the property value from December 1983 to October 1990.2" '
The claims court held that there was no taking because the Sheldens
failed to show any actual damage resulting from the placing of the lis
pendens on the property."6 The court reasoned that the Sheldens were
prevented from foreclosing not by the Government's actions, but by the
mortgagors' actions."7
In reversing the lower court's decision, the Federal Circuit analogized
the case to Armstrong."8 The court found that, although the mortgagors
were allowed to retain record title while their appeal was pending, the
forfeiture order made clear that title had actually passed to the United
States.2"9 Therefore, foreclosure against the mortgagors would have
been futile.2 The plaintiffs were thus entitled to the fair market value
of the property as of the date of transfer to the Government, minus compensation received."2 ' The court also stated that deterioration of the
property was not a prerequisite to recovery.2"
These cases show that courts will recognize takings claims in the forfeiture context. The next Section sets forth the potential applicability of
the Takings Clause in the different situations that may arise under the
forfeiture statutes.
B.

FactualContexts in Which Takings Claims May Arise

There are a number of scenarios in which takings claims may arise in
the forfeiture context. Some of these include:
Scenario A
The Government seizes or obtains a restraining order on assets prior

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1025.

at
at
at
at
at
at

1025-26.
1026.
1026-28.
1027.
1028.
1031.
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to a civil or criminal trial but the trial court finds that the seizure or
restraint was excessive, irrespective of whether forfeiture is ultimately
ordered. Alternatively, the trial or appellate court reduces the amount
forfeited because that amount is excessive. While the excess amount
of property is in the Government's control, the owner suffers damages
because the Government has assumed control of the property or because the property has lost value, or both.
Scenario B
The Government seizes or obtains a restraining order on assets prior
to trial, but fails to obtain a final forfeiture order, because (a) it decides not to proceed with the civil forfeiture case, (b) in a criminal
case, it disposes of the case or drops the forfeiture request, or (c) it
loses at the civil forfeiture trial or substantive criminal trial. While the
excess amount of property is in the Government's control, the owner
suffers damages because the Government has assumed control of the
property or because the property has lost value, or both.
Scenario C
The Government obtains forfeiture of the property, but the forfeiture is
reversed either because (a) in a civil forfeiture case the trial court or
the appellant court reverses the forfeiture decision, or (b) in the case
of a criminal forfeiture the trial court voids the forfeiture, or the criminal conviction is reversed, or the forfeiture is overturned on appeal.
Scenario D
The Government seizes property, which is later returned to a third
party uninvolved with the crime, such as a lienholder. The property
declines in value, or the third party loses interest and incurs expenses
in the interim, or both.
Each of these situations involves various permutations, and each permutation requires distinct analysis under the Takings Clause. Most significantly, the outcome may hinge on whether the claimant can establish
innocent owner status.
1.

Scenario A: Excessive Pretrial Seizure or Restraints

In light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Austin and
Alexander, applying the Eighth Amendment to civil and criminal forfeitures, there is a substantial likelihood in a particular case that the initial
amount frozen, or the amount ultimately forfeited, will later be found to
be excessive. An excessive seizure of, restraint on, or forfeiture of property could give rise to a takings claim in a number of ways.

The notorious case of United States v. Regan [the "Princeton-Newport"
case]22 provides a good example of how such a takings claim might
arise. Pretrial, the Government in Regan obtained an order freezing the
assets of Princeton-Newport Partners, a securities firm.224 Arguably as a
result of the restraining order, the business liquidated prior to the criminal trial."2 In the interim, the court ordered a reduction in the amount
initially frozen.226
As to the forfeiture itself, the defendants were convicted at their criminal trial and the jury awarded forfeiture.227 The trial judge later set aside
the forfeiture on the grounds that it violated the Eighth Amendment.2"
Ultimately, almost all of the substantive convictions in the case were
reversed on appeal.229
Using the Regan case as an example of a takings claim where there is
an excessive seizure or forfeiture, such claims could arise under alternative theories. The claimant could argue that, because excessive seizure or
forfeiture, or both, destroyed the asset's value, the Government effected
an unlawful permanent taking of all the assets.20" The amount of the
loss was the value lost by the owners of the frozen assets. Alternatively,
the excess amount initially frozen and forfeited, as illustrated by
Regan,"l may constitute a temporary taking.232 Under this theory, the

223. 699 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Regan led to substantial commentary, and
ultimately to congressional hearings, on the use of forfeiture statutes to restrain third
parties' property. See, e.g., Scott J. Paltrow, 6 Plead Not Guilty to Racketeering, LA.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1988, at D12.
224. Regan, 699 F. Supp. at 37.
225. Stephen J. Adler, Heated Argument: Are RICO Seizures a Violation of Rights,
As Critics Contend?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1989, at Al, A6; Princeton/Newport Will
Liquidate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1988, at 38.
226. Regan, 699 F. Supp. at 37.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 39.
229. United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1988) (dissolving the
restraining order on the property of unindlicted third parties); see also United States
v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823, 829-30 (2d Cir.) (remanding the RICO count that was premised on reversed tax conviction), amended by, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991) (amending previous order and vacating conspiracy charges against four defendants), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 940 (1992).
230. Shelden v. United States, 7 F.3d 1022, 1027-28 (Fed. Cir. 1993); cf. Alde, S.A. v.
United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 26, 34 (1993) (holding that the destruction of plaintiffs airplane by Hurricane Hugo while in possession of the United States Government did
not amount to a compensable taldng); B & F Trawlers, Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed.
Cl. 299, 304-06 (1992) (holding that the sinking of a burning vessel under control of
United States Coast Guard is not a compensable taking because it "constituted a
danger to navigation" and was thus a valid exercise of the government's police powers).
231. The Government obtained a restraining order on all the defendants' assets and
all of the firm's assets. United States v. Regan, 699 F. Supp. 36, 37 (1988). These

[Vol. 23: 449, 1996]

Forfeitures and Just Compensation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

loss is the diminution in value from the time of the original freeze order
to the time of either the later order decreasing the amount frozen or the
later order overturning the jury's forfeiture award.2"
2.

Scenario B: The Failure to Obtain Final Forfeiture Award

An example of this scenario arose in Shelden, where the original forfeiture order was never finalized, and the Government and the defense entered into a plea agreement after the defendant's conviction was reversed
on appeal.' The court found that the claimant was entitled to compensation as a result of the restraint on the property.3
3.

Scenario C: Case Ends Upon Reversal

In Regan, the forfeiture in the final instance was not effected because
the convictions were reversed and the Government declined to retry the
charges." Therefore, the seizure and forfeiture arguably constituted an
unlawful temporary taking. Under this theory, the loss was the difference
in the value of the assets on the date of the original freeze order and the
value on the date of the reversal.
The facts in State ex rel. Schrunk v. Metz 7 provide another example
of this scenario. In that case, the defendant was charged criminally with
conducting illegal gambling activities in his restaurant.' The State initiated parallel civil forfeiture proceedings and seized the property." Be-

were valued at $1.3 billion, although the estimated criminal proceeds were approximately $446,653.00. See Rohrer, supra note 183, at 1685. The government requested
forfeitures of more than $30 million, but the district court limited the forfeitures to
$14 million to reflect the assets of the defendants. See id. at 1687; Roger Parloff &
Rifka Rosenwein, Princeton/Newport Fallout Predicted, MANHATTAN LAW., Dec. 13-19,

1988, at 1.
232. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
233. See Regan, 699 F. Supp. at 38; see also Shelden, 7 F.3d at 1024 (ordering damages as a result of the loss of value from the time the government assumed control
of the property).
234. Shelden, 7 F.3d at 1025.
235. Id. at 1031.
236. See United States v. Regan, 699 F. Supp. 36, 37-38 (1988); L. Gordon Crovitz,
The RICO Monster Turns Against Its Master, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1992, at A15.
237. 867 P.2d 503 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
238. Id. at 506.
239. Id.

cause the restaurants ceased to produce income, the owners went into
default on their debts, and the assets were subsequently turned over to
the creditors.24
After the defendant was acquitted of all criminal charges, he filed a
counterclaim for just compensation in the civil forfeiture proceeding that
the State had previously commenced against the property.24" ' The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the State in the
civil action on the grounds that the seizure was a valid exercise of the
police power and that the owner-claimant, who had been the defendant
in the criminal action, failed to prove innocent ownership under CaleroToledo.242
4.

Scenario D: Third Party Losses During Seizure

Lienholders and other third parties may lose interest and incur costs,
including attorneys' fees, during seizure. Most courts hold such losses to
be compensable.
C. Analysis Under Nollan and Dolan
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Nollan and Dolan articulated specific tests that the Government must meet to avoid payment of
just compensation. Those cases arose in the context of conditions imposed upon property owners in exchange for building permits. Courts
have applied the cases, however, in situations other than the permit condition context,2" including situations involving seizures and forfeitures.
Therefore, although Nollan and Dolan did not arise in the forfeiture context, it is possible that claimants could rely on those cases in this setting.

240. Id.
241. Id. at 506-07.
242. Id. at 508. The exercise of police power ground, standing alone, should not
defeat a just compensation claim. See supra notes 38-55, 193-98 and accompanying

text.
243. See, e.g., In re Metmor Fin. Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 449-50 (4th Cir. 1987) (requiring
payment of post-seizure interest to innocent property owners).
244. See, e.g., Peterman v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 521 N.W.2d 499, 511-12
(Mich. 1994) (applying the Dolan "rough proportionality" test in a takings claim arising out of the destruction of beachfront property caused by sand filtration); see also
Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson, 37 F.3d 468, 473-76 (9th Cir. 1994)
(citing the Nollan and Dolan tests in a takings challenge to rent control laws);
McMahan v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 858
F. Supp. 529, 542 (1994) (using Nollan and Lucas to analyze a takings challenge to
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 504(d), but
finding that the Penn Central factors, as restated in Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 212 (1986), controlled).
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Under the threshold question established by Nollan, the Government,
in order to defend against a just compensation claim, must prove that the
regulation substantially advanced a legitimate state interest.15 Furthermore, under Dolan, a claimant could argue that the Government cannot
meet its burden of proving "rough proportionality" between its legitimate
interests and the amount frozen or restrained. These arguments will vary
according to the scenario in which the claim arises.
Under Scenario A, where pretrial restraints or seizures are deemed
excessive, the claimant could analogize to the facts in Nollan and argue
that the restriction on use of the property was not sufficiently related to
the legitimate governmental interest in preserving or obtaining forfeiture
of the property. For example, as to pre-trial restraint, the posting of a
bond in a reasonable amount would have sufficed.24
Likewise, under Dolan, excessive seizure or forfeiture would not be
proportionate to the Government's interests. The facts of Dolan lend
weight to this argument. In that case, the Government established goals
the Court accepted as legitimate-reducing traffic flow and increasing
storm drainage-and articulated findings that supported these goals. 47
The Court found an uncompensated taldng, however, because the Government failed to establish the "rough proportionality" between the burden on property and the governmental interest.2" The same analysis on
its face may apply to excessive seizures or forfeitures of property. 9
Under this theory, an excessive seizure or forfeiture in its entirety effects

245. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
246. See United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 1988) ("The government
has conceded-as it must in light of the express provisions of Section
1963(d)(1)-that a bond in an amount equivalent to the value of the partnership interests at the time of the crimes would eliminate the need for the challenged order.").
247. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317-18 (1994).

248. Id. at 2322.
249. A claimant could cite the revised Department of Justice prosecutorial guidelines, limiting pretrial restraints, in support of this argument. The purpose of the revision was "to reserve the use of TROs for cases in which no less ihitrusive device
would serve the government's interest, to identify the impact a TRO could have on
third parties, to establish a principle of proportionality between forfeiture and offense,
and to head off public criticism of TROs." Justice Department Limits Use Of RICO
In White Collar Cases, 58 U.S.L.W. 2273 (Nov. 7, 1989) (referring to the revised United States Attorneys' manual). The Government would likely argue that the forfeiture
statutes do not require that it proceed by the least restrictive means and that in any
event, the Department of Justice guidelines are merely internal policy statements and
are not constitutionally compelled.

a compensable taking because the seizure or forfeiture by definition is
not "roughly proportionate" to the governmental goals. Therefore, any
loss attributable to the seizure or forfeiture should be compensable.
Alternatively, the claimant in such a situation could argue that compensation is due, not for losses resulting from the entire seizure or forfeiture, but only for the amount found to have been in excess of that needed to serve the Government's interest. Under this approach, the claimant
would argue that freezing the excess amount, by definition, served no
legitimate goal.
The second approach appears to provide a particularly strong case for
just compensation. If excessive seizures or forfeitures were to go uncompensated, the Government could obtain an excessive freeze order or seek
excessive forfeiture in order to coerce a defendant into pleading guilty or
to drive a defendant out of business before trial. Such governmental
overreaching falls within the category of actions that, as the Court held
in Nollan and Dolan, require compensation.25 °
If the Government loses at trial or disposes of a case without obtaining
forfeiture, as in Scenario B, the facts would seem analogous to the facts
in Shelden, where the Government eventually turned title over to the
mortgagee.25 A legitimate governmental interest is served under Nollan
because the Government is simply attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to
further the forfeiture statutes' stated goals. A claimant might argue that
the result should be different under Dolan, where the Government was
required to show "rough proportionality" between its interests and the
burden on property rights. This is a burden that cannot be met where the
purposes of the forfeiture statutes are not served.
In some cases, where property is frozen pending a successful appeal,
as in Scenario C, substantial losses may occur. In Regan, for example,
the restraining order on the partnership's assets was eventually invalidated, but only after the partnership was liquidated.252 The Government
announced that it would not retry the case.2" A claimant whose property is forfeited pending an appeal that is ultimately successful could therefore argue under Nollan that the forfeiture served no legitimate governmental interest. The claimant could also argue under Dolan that the forfeiture was not proportionate to the governmental interest.
The Government's likely response would be that criminal seizures and
forfeitures, like any criminal penalty, serve legitimate law enforcement
interests even if the defense prevails on appeal. Also, the Government

250. See Dokn, 114 S. Ct. at 2319; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 842 (1987).
251. Shelden v. United States, 7 F.3d 1022, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
252. Rohrer, supra note 183, at 1697-98.
253. Id. at 1689.
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may assert that there is a significant distinction between truly innocent
claimants, like the Shelden plaintiffs, and criminal defendants, such as
those in Regan.' Presumably, this argument would not be available if
the claimants were unindicted third parties.255
Under Scenario D, third parties completely uninvolved in any criminal
wrongdoing have a simple argument under Nollan and Dolan: No governmental interests are served by taking their property without just compensation.2" Many courts have found this argument persuasive.25
D. Analysis under the Lucas Test
Assuming either that a court were to find Nollan and Dolan inapplicable to the takings context or that the Government were able to pass the
Nollan and Dolan tests, a claimant theoretically could still prevail under
Lucas in certain circumstances. Lucas requires that the claimant prove
(1) there was a physical invasion of the property or (2) the regulation
denied all economically beneficial or productive use of the property."z
The Lucas test would appear to apply equally to all the scenarios discussed above, subject to the particular governmental action in the case.
Again, Regan provides an interesting example. In that case, the Government obtained an excessive freeze order restricting business activities.' On these facts, a claimant could argue that the restrictions on
business operations amounted to a physical invasion. Such an argument,
however, may stretch the Lucas holding because the owners in Regan
were still allowed substantial use of the property."u

254. See id.
255. See United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1988).
256. See supra notes 64-104 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 44849 (4th Cir. 1987).
258. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
259. United States v. Regan, 699 F. Supp. 36, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
260. Id.; see Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992) (holding that the
rent control ordinance at issue did not amount to a physical taldng because it did
not compel the property owner to submit to a physical occupation of the property);
FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987) (holding that economic regulations imposed on landlords are not takings). Note, however, that only a minimal
physical invasion of the property is required in order for the plaintiff to recover. See,
e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding that a state law requiring landlords to allow the installation of a one and one-half
cubic foot cable television box constituted a taldng); see also Loveladies Harbor, Inc.
v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179-83 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that total destruction
of economic value of property is not required for recovery under Lucas).

A claimant in circumstances such as Regan could also argue that the
freeze order divested the investors of all economically beneficial use of
the property. What Lucas would appear to cover, however, would be a
situation where the Government obtained an order that investment funds
could not be used for the intended purpose at all, rather than an order
placing certain restrictions on the use of those funds.26 ' The Lucas dissent noted that the owner of the coastal property was not denied all use
of his land by the regulations; he simply could not build upon it.262
Therefore, Lucas hardly establishes a bright-line rule; the per se rule
will apply even if the owner retains incidental benefits from the property.
Nonetheless, pretrial restraints short of actual physical occupation appear not to implicate the Lucas holding. In the other scenarios set forth
above and subject to the innocent/guilty owner restrictions discussed
below," governmental occupation of the premises would appear to require compensation under Lucas."
E.

The Penn Central Test

If a court found that a claimant could not succeed under Lucas,
Nollan, or Dolan, it would appear that the Penn Central factors would
come into play by default. 64 Again, those factors are: (1) the severity of
the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the "character
of the governmental action"; and (3) "the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations."26 In the
forfeiture context, the first factor generally weighs in favor of the
claimant and the third in favor of government. Therefore, a just compensation claim based upon a seizure or forfeiture will probably most often
turn on application of the second factor.
1.

Economic Impact

Under the first factor, the claimant would have to establish that the

261. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893-95.
262. Id. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263. See infra notes 278-85 and accompanying text.
264. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
265. See McMahan v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers, 858 F. Supp. 529, 542 (1994) (analyzing the takings claim under Nollan and
Lucas, but finding that the Penn Central factors, as restated in Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 212 (1986), controlled).
266. ConneUy, 475 U.S. at 225 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)); see also Golden Pacific Bankcorp v. United States, 15
F.3d 1066, 1072 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 420 (1994); Washington Legal
Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 974 (1st Cir. 1993). For a discussion of the Penn Central factors, see KUSHNER, supra note 28, at § 3.05[1] & [2].
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governmental action resulted in an economic loss. Under Scenario A,
assuming the claimant could prove causation, an excessive restraint or
forfeiture could produce clear economic loss in some circumstances, as
in the Regan case.267 Under Scenarios B and C, where the Government
fails to obtain criminal forfeiture or there is a reversal on appeal, an
owner could endure losses, as in Shelden.2" Under Scenario D, a truly
innocent third party could likewise entail economic losses as discussed
below.
2.

Character of Governmental Action

The third factor seems to mirror the Nollan threshold test, which requires that the regulation have served a legitimate governmental interest.
If the Government succeeds under Nollan by arguing law enforcement interests, and a court applies the Penn Central test, then the character of
the governmental regulation simply becomes part of the balancing
test.269
Again, the Government would likely argue that the civil and criminal
forfeiture statutes give it broad discretion to seize or restrain property
pretrial in order to deter crimes and deprive criminals of the fruits of
their labors. Accordingly, pretrial restraints serve an important function,
and a later acquittal, reversal, or invalidation of a forfeiture should not
give rise to a takings claim. If it did, the Government would be deterred

267. Courts have held that unless the Government action causes the loss there is
no requirement of compensation. See Smith v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 430, 439
(1993) (holding that the landowner failed to establish that the Government's construction or operation of a dam was the direct and proximate cause of the erosion
to his riverfront property), affd, 19 F.3d 39 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v.
United States, 6 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that to recover under
the Takings Clause, a claimant with a recognized property interest must show that
his interest was "taken").
268. Shelden v. United States, 7 F.3d 1022, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
269. See McMahan, 858 F. Supp. at 529. In McMahan, the defendant was indicted

and convicted of crimes related to his business relationship with a trade union. Id. at
533. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 504(d), McMahan's union salary was placed in. escrow
during the litigation. McMahan, 858 F. Supp. at 533. His conviction was later overturned, and he sought his back salary. Id. at 533-34. The union argued that a return
of the salary pursuant to the statute would violate the Takings Clause. Id. at 539.
The court applied the Penn Central test, as restated in Connolly. Id. at 540. The
court noted that the defendant was clearly engaged in the alleged scheme and that
the conviction was reversed because the government charged the defendant under the
wrong theory. Id. at 541. Therefore, the "character of the governmental action"
weighed strongly in support of the statute on the facts of the case. Id.

from ever seeking forfeiture, and the forfeiture statutes' effectiveness
would be undermined.
The thrust of recent Supreme Court takings cases, however, is that the
Constitution requires just compensation. Claimants would thus argue that
allowing a civil cause of action against the Government will not undermine its law enforcement efforts any more than allowing takings claims
in the land use context undermines the Government's ability to regulate
land use. Indeed, courts have indicated that takings claims would be allowed in the context of criminal forfeitures under the RICO statute.27
3.

Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations

In a case where the Government interferes with use of a business or
other property, the claimants could argue that the seizure deprived them
of their investment. This argument would appear to apply under any of
the above scenarios, regardless of whether the Government's action involves a temporary or permanent assumption of control over the
property.
In a Regan situation, for example, where the Government restricts the
operations of an ongoing business, the business owners could claim that
the Government destroyed a substantial, ongoing, and highly profitable
business. In Shekden, the Government's control over a home resulted in
the property's deterioration.27 ' Just as the property owners in NoUan
and Lucas expected to be able to make economic use of their property,
the property owners in Regan and Shelden also expected to be able both
to maintain the value of their investments and to gain a profit on those
investments.
If the Government's action forever lessens or destroys the property's
value, then the government may have effected a permanent taking, entitling the owner to just compensation.272 Under Scenario A, where there

270. United States v. 1980 Lear Jet, 38 F.3d 398, 401 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A]t least
for purposes of constitutional taldng analysis, a forfeiture under RICO was tantamount to a forfeiture under [the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control

Act].").
271. Shelden, 7 F.3d at 1025.
272. Cf. Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 975
(1st Cir. 1993).
We find no logical analogy between the physical invasion of real property, as
in Kaiser and Loretto, and the operation of the IOLTA Rule. The plaintiffs'
taldngs claim involves intangible property rights not real property. To bolster
their claim of physical invasion, the plaintiffs contend that their property
rights are nearly identical to the claimants' property rights in Webb's . .. in
which the Court stated "The [govemment's] appropriation of the beneficial
use of the fund is analogous to the appropriation of the use of private property."
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is only an excess seizure or forfeiture, a claimant in a case like Regan
may prevail under the theory that this was a temporary taking entitled to
just compensation.273 As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that
temporary restrictions on the use of real property may give rise to takings claims.274 As one prosecutor in the Regan case later wrote,
It is well established that temporary deprivations of property, such as those resulting from the entry of a restraining order, are deprivations of 'property' 2 7 .....
There can be no question that a pre-judgment restraining order even of the partial
type used
in Princeton-Newport, is a deprivation of property in a constitutional
7
sense.26

In most circumstances, a seizure or forfeiture that is later found to be
excessive or is later overturned will have interfered with clear "investment-backed expectations." Of course, if owners are aware of the
property's misuse, then their expectations may not be found to be reasonable.177 Depending upon how the innocent owner factor plays out,
any of the factual scenarios set forth above could give rise to a successful just compensation claim under Penn Central.
F.

The "Innocent Owner" Question

In Calero-Toledo, the Supreme Court implied that an owner who was
neither involved in nor aware of the property's misuse, and who had
taken reasonable precautions to prevent the misuse, would likely have a
just compensation claim in the forfeiture context.278 Some civil forfeiture statutes do provide for an innocent owner defense where the
claimant can show lack of knowledge of or consent to the illegal

Id. (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-64
(1980)).
273. For the proposition that claimants can recover attorneys' fees, see United
States v. 41741 National Trails Way, 989 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
lienholders could recover attorneys' fees if innocent or possessing a preexisting deed
of trust); United States v. 2471 Venus Drive, 949 F.2d 374, 375 (10th Cir. 1991)

(same).
274. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987).
275. Bruce A. Baird & Carolyn P. Vinson, RICO Pretrial Restraints and Due Process: The Lessons of Princeton/Newport, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1990).

276. Id. at 1030; see also Rohrer, supra note 183, at 1686.
277. See California Hous. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 958 (Fed Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 324 (1992) (holding that the government's appropriation of
property was not a Fifth Amendment taking).
278. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974).

activity,279 while other forfeiture statutes provide no such defense.'
Criminal forfeiture statutes, of course, provide no innocent owner defense because criminal forfeiture is predicated upon the owner's conviction."'
Under any of the takings tests outlined above, a property owner's
claim to innocent owner status may have a decisive impact on a takings
claim. Further, an innocent owner can be defined at least four ways:
(1)
In a civil forfeiture case, an owner who meets the Calero-Toledo test of lack of knowledge, coupled with reasonable precautions.
(2)
In a civil forfeiture case, an owner who meets the statutory
definition of innocent owner but not the Calero-Toledo test.
(3)
In a criminal case, a defendant-owner who has been acquitted
or whose conviction has been reversed and who meets the
Calero-Toledo test.
(4)
In a criminal case, a defendant-owner who has been acquitted
or whose conviction has been reversed, but who cannot meet
the Calero-Toledo test.
It seems that in any case where the owner meets the Calero-Toledo
test under definitions (1) and (3) above, and the seizure or forfeiture has
effected economic harm on the owner, a takings claim would lie. The
governmental interests in seizure and forfeiture-which are key under all
the tests discussed above-appear to be minimal here. Specifically, the
primary goal of the forfeiture statutes-to deter illegal use of property-cannot apply where the owner has taken all reasonable precautions.
In addition, there is a strong argument that anyone who meets a statutorily-defined innocent owner test in a civil forfeiture case, as in defimition (2), should not be precluded from asserting innocent owner status

279. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and (7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing innocent
owner defense in drug related forfeiture). See generally PARKER & STRADER, supM
note 105, at § 6A.02[4]. Some courts use the reasonable precautions test from CaleroToledo to modify the "consent" prong of the innocent owner defense. See id. at
§ 6A.02[4][d]. Other courts, however, place a less onerous burden on claimants. Under the former approach, an owner must show not merely lack of consent, but also
affirmative precautionary actions. See id.
280. See, e.g., United States v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander 680 Aircraft,
671 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying 49 U.S.C. §§ 1474, 1509 (1988)); United
States v. $72,420 U.S. Currency, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16860, at *9-11 (N.D. Il. 1994)
(applying 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) which sets the standard for the
export of monetary instruments).
281. Although the criminal forfeiture statutes do not provide for intervention by
third-party claimants, courts have allowed such intervention. See United States v.
Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 1988). See generally PARKER & STRADER, supra note
105, at § 6A.0314].
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and from prevailing on a just compensation claim. As noted above,
Calero-Toledo's underlying assumption that civil forfeiture is not punishment was rejected in Austin." Likewise, Calero-Toledo's extremely exacting innocent owner test is unfair to owners operating without knowledge of or consent to the wrongdoing. Affirmative precautions should
not be required, especially given that Congress has not mandated such a
stringent test.
Analysis under the fourth definition of innocent owner involving a
criminal defendant who ultimately is not convicted is by far the most
perplexing. In such a case, which could arise under scenarios B and C
above, the ultimate forfeiture depended upon proof of crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, as contrasted with the probable cause/preponderance
of the evidence standard in civil forfeitures. If the Government has failed
to prove the crime, then criminal forfeiture is not possible. In the absence of a subsequent civil forfeiture proceeding,' property loss due to
a seizure or a failed forfeiture should require just compensation irrespective of whether the claimant can meet the Calero-Toledo test. Here, the
Government's justification for forfeiture as part of the criminal punishment does not exist. If the Government cannot provide a justification for
the property loss, then a takings claim is appropriate under
NollaniDolan, under Penn Central, and even under Lucas if the twoprong Lucas test is met.
If the Government seeks to obtain forfeiture in a subsequent civil proceeding, then the nature of the defendant's action may be relevant to the
"character of government action" prong of the Penn Central test. For
example, if the defendant clearly engaged in wrongdoing, but escaped
criminal liability for procedural reasons, then the Government arguably
has a strong argument under Penn Central.' Conversely, conviction
does not necessarily mean the defendant has no takings claim as, for
example, where the property is unrelated to the crime.'
In a given case, then, the viability of a takings claim will depend upon
a number of facts specific to that case. As outlined above, courts have

282. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2809-12 (1993).
283. Such a scenario is possible under the statutes, but may violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
284. See .McMahan v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers, 858 F. Supp. 529, 539-40 (D.S.C. 1994) (stating that defendant's wrongdoing-despite a reversal of his conviction based upon technical grounds--weighed in
favor of the Government under the Penn Central test).
285. See Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 290, 297 & n.12 (1991) (dictum).

begun to recognize that just compensation may be required in the context of seizures and forfeitures.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Seizures and forfeitures have clearly become one of the Government's
principal crime-fighting weapons over the last decade. Designed to deprive criminals of the fruits of their crimes, while incidentally providing
the Government with substantial revenues, these proceedings are now
widely used across the country.
The success of the forfeiture weapon has, however, provoked new
restrictions on the use of that weapon. When the current United States
Supreme Court places itself on the side of individual rights in the law enforcement context, it is surely sending a signal that this newest anticrime tool goes too far. The next logical step in the Court's scrutiny of
forfeitures is to focus on remedies available to property owners.
Recent developments in both the law of takings and the law of forfeitures illustrate the Court's increased focus on individual property rights.
Eighth Amendment excessive fines analysis, however, is not sufficient to
protect property owners where the seizure or forfeiture does not result
in a final forfeiture order and the property is returned to the owner. At
this point in the history of takings law, then, it seems inevitable that the
Court will place its imprimatur on the use of the Takings Clause as yet
another constitutional restriction on the Government's forfeiture powers.
Whether the Court has anticipated this use of its new takings cases is
uncertain and points to the potentially revolutionary nature of those
cases.

